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ABSTRACT: This article aims to expose the main governmental shifts in recent American 
history (1961-2000) by examining two programs: the Assistance to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) and the Agency for International development (US-AID).  Through the ex-
ploration of primary and secondary sources, we analyse the production, organisation and 
circulation of governmental practices in the realms of both domestic and foreign policy.  In the 
American context, practices of government typically revolve around freedom, efficiency mo-
dels and individual responsibility.  Throughout the analysis, we find that the general critiques 
which have guided reforms and experiments in both areas converge around the same ele-
ments.  This testifies to the fact that the reflexions and technical models directed at the optimal 
management of populations are more far-reaching than they first appear.  Moreover, the his-
torical transformations in welfare and foreign aid practices bear out the increasingly disci-
plinary nature of the administration and objectification of the poor, both within the United 
States and internationally. 
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Governmentality 
In contrast to traditional historical and social scientific approaches, governmentality makes ex-
plicit the main standards that shape individual choices in daily life and that guide the stra-
tegies of institutions in the public realm.  It provides the best possible assessment of the recent 
technical and ideational transformations that have pervaded important policy areas such as 
welfare and foreign aid in the United States. 
The presentation and explanation of governmentality by Foucault and his followers is 
very well rehearsed and will not be treated here.1 Instead, this article will focus on the power 
                                                 
1 See Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality: Volume 1 (London: Penguin Books, 
1978); Michel Foucault, ‚Governmentality,‛ in Colin Gordon, Graham Burchell and Peter Miller (eds.), The 
Foucault Effect; Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991); Michel Foucault, Securité, 
Territoire, Population: Cours au Collège de France, 1977-1978 (Paris: Gallimard, Seuil Hautes Études, 2004); 
Michel Foucault, Naissance de la Biopolitique: Cours au College de France, 1978-1979 (Paris: Gallimard, Seuil 
Hautes Études, 2004).  For the best secondary sources on governmentality refer to: Mitchell Dean, Govern-
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and knowledge configurations and the models of the self that are purported in the enactment 
of specific reforms and policies.  Taking into consideration the peculiarities of American libe-
ralism, the analysis presents a series of governmental arrangements that combine different as-
pects of welfare and neoliberal rationalities over the course of four decades.  Notably, the main 
reflexions and solutions that apply to the management of the domestic population seem to be 
replicated in the management of economic and political relations with other countries.  In spite 
of a few differences, international aid and welfare programs have the same general object: the 
study, observation and potential transformation of the ‚poor.‛  Within an advanced liberal ra-
tionality of rule, it becomes evident that the poor constitute the ever present, somewhat ano-
nymous category upon which ideologues, experts and politicians base their research, dis-
courses and policies. 
This article will present the techniques and modes of thought that have been employed 
in the administration of the poor in the United States and abroad through the examination of 
two programs; the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID).  These programs were chosen as objects of 
analysis because they embody some of the crucial transformations in recent American history 
and because they both take poverty as an object of inquiry and manipulation.  The AFDC and 
USAID both originated in the early 1960s, a period of unprecedented involvement and en-
largement of the national state.  From the constitution of the American state as a technocratic 
entity through to its reincarnation as a partner in the promotion of individual enterprise and 
moral responsibility, these massive programs present an acute reflection of the combinations 
and displacements of modernizing and neoliberal rationales.  Whilst the relationship between 
welfare and foreign aid has a long history, we chose to limit our enquiry to a period of forty 
years (1960-2000), which we believe contains the blueprint for contemporary debates on 
welfare and development.  The programs in question have rarely been studied in a systematic 
way.  However, they contain a range of influential directives on how to live one’s life: not 
through philosophical maxims but through concrete measures that dictate or in many cases 
limit one’s options.  The historical study of welfare and foreign aid also reveals the fleeting 
contours and the ever changing dynamics of an advanced liberal rationality of government in 
the contemporary United States.  Furthermore, it points to the increasingly strict conditions 
tied to state assistance and to the increasingly severe sanctions imposed on those who dero-
gate to the rules. 
Through this article, we hope to contribute to the already rich stream of Foucaultian 
scholarship by offering a critical study of contemporary forms of power in the United States.  
This entails destabilizing the conventional meanings associated with American values such as 
freedom and democracy, not by quantifying them in terms of presence or absence but by 
situating them as historical, discursive constructions that are configured according to the 
strategic necessities of a given rationality of government.  By comparing domestic configura-
                                                                                                                                                                  
mentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
1999); Colin Gordon, ‚Governmental Rationality: Introduction,‛ in Colin Gordon, Graham Burchell and 
Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect; and Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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tions of power with those of American foreign policy, we also aim to extend the usual ana-
lytical scope of governmentality and to offer an investigation that could be of interest for a 
variety of fields (i.e. International Relations, Political Science and Sociology). 
 
1. Welfare: a Governmental History 
We specifically chose to look at the Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) pro-
gram because it relates to important areas of governmentality such as the family and labour, 
which means that it is also connected to the transcription and regulation of a range of personal 
dispositions.  Since its inception as one of the largest welfare programs in recent U.S. history, it 
has undergone myriad reforms which bear out the wider shifts in governmental rationalities.  
For the sake of convenience, we look at the AFDC by decades.2  Through the exploration of 
primary and secondary sources, we draw out the conflation of techniques, discourses and 
intellectual constructs that have contributed to shaping the roles and responsibilities of indivi-
duals and institutions in the contemporary United States.  Although they are defined diffe-
rently at any given time, the practices of government which have traversed these four decades 
typically revolve around the themes of freedom, responsibility and efficiency.  The latter all 
play some part in the constitution and development of personal life, policy-making and know-
ledge constructions in the contemporary United States.  As rationalities of rule play out and 
are assessed and modified, diverse power/knowledge configurations, from the theory of mo-
dernization through to the efficiency models of neoliberalism, emerge.    
 
The AFDC (1962-1996) 
In 1962, the Kennedy administration introduced the Public Welfare Amendment, of which the 
AFDC was an important component.  From then on, assistance was extended to family mem-
bers or relatives living under the same roof as the children whose upbringing was deemed to 
require more favourable conditions.  This was one federal initiative among many (Office for 
Economic Opportunity, Maximum Feasible Participation, Community Action Program, etc.) in 
the general attempt to eliminate poverty.  Subject to unprecedented visibility and increased 
political will, inequality became one of the main preoccupations of American public life du-
ring the 1960s.  Indeed, the extensive program of social protection under John F.  Kennedy was 
concomitant with the American people’s ‘rediscovery’ of poverty.3  Bestselling books such as 
Michael Harrington’s The Other America4 and MacDonald’s Our Invisible Poor5 revealed the 
unseen harms of American capitalism and the social problems which needed to be addressed 
by the state.   
                                                 
2The division in decades is largely made for the sake of clarity. The continuities, discontinuities, combina-
tions, struggles and conquests inherent to the constitution of rationalities of government elude temporal 
delineations. 
3 June Axinn and Herman Levin, Social Welfare: A History of the American Response to Need (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1995), 239.  
4 Michael Harrington, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 1962).   
5 Dwight MacDonald, Our Invisible Poor (New York and Sydney: Hillman Foundation, 1963). 
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In the statement of intent of the Office of Economic Opportunity, created in 1965, 
poverty is defined as ‚a condition of need, helplessness and hopelessness.‛6  The discursive 
constitution of poverty as an unacceptable ill which required urgent intervention, prepared 
the ground for a series of new strategies.  The delivery of an increasing array of programs dea-
ling with poverty, but also with crime and unemployment, required the creation of new state 
agencies and of improved methods for the circulation of information between the various 
administrative tiers.  In order to conceive and implement its ambitious welfare plans, the 
Kennedy administration enlisted an unprecedented number of experts and academics.  The 
latter contributed to the mapping out, division and classification of the different areas of inter-
vention and to the introduction of stricter efficiency quotas in the conduct of socio-political 
reforms.  In the context of a dominance of behaviouralism and structuralism in American aca-
demic circles, quantitative research and other scientific methodologies were readily applied to 
social policy.  Power/knowledge configurations characteristic of the Kennedy/Johnson admini-
strations also represented a remarkable unity of purpose, which brought together a great 
variety of professional communities all intent on eradicating political and economic inequa-
lities.  This outlook was characteristic of ‚modernization,‛ which David Apter defines as ‚the 
process of consciously directing and controlling the social consequences of the increased role 
of differentiation and organizational complexity in society.‛7 Modernization was then a way to 
cope with the managerial, technological and infrastructural exigencies that emerged in the 
context of a rapidly growing economy and of an expanding welfare state, but it was also asso-
ciated with the belief that knowledge and scientific progress had to be used to improve human 
life.8 
In the American case, however, the realization of general welfare rested heavily on the 
development of individual qualities.  Even as government in the 1960s intervened on the gene-
ral ‚nexus of collective solidarities and dependencies,‛ one of the specific objectives of these 
sweeping reforms was to reverse the attitudes associated with poverty and to instil a new 
ethos of self-sufficiency, optimism and motivation.9  Concurrently with the looming influence 
of neoliberal economists like Hayek and members of Chicago School such as Gary S. Becker, 
the notion of rational choice became one of the cornerstones of governmental plans, not only 
in the economic domain but in a variety of other spheres such as social security and family life.  
The more radical proponents of American neoliberalism tended to apply economics to ‚all 
purposive conduct entailing strategic choices between alternative paths, means, and instru-
ments.‛10  Within the constraints of their personal traits and aptitudes, it was assumed that 
individuals would seek to maximize the rewards of a particular choice, whether it be the 
                                                 
6 Barbara Cruishank, The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1999), 73.  
7 David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), 56. 
8 Ibid., 433.  
9 Nikolas Rose, ‚Governing Advanced Liberal Democracies,‛ in Barry et al. (eds.), Foucault and Political Rea-
son: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism and Rationalities of government (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 40. 
10 Gordon, Governmental Rationality, 43. 
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choice of a life partner or a job.   If economics was indeed capable ‚of addressing the totality of 
human behaviour,‛ it could surely be used to program ‚the totality of governmental action.‛11  
The welfare subject of the 1960s was bound by the requirement of self-sufficiency, but 
was also compelled to lead a ‘moral’ life.  Private life and individual attitudes were made into 
objects of observation and manipulation insofar as the sum of personal proclivities affected the 
general stability of the social order.  The responsibility of generating and preserving the social 
order fell to the central state, which had every interest in producing autonomous and ordered 
subjects.  One of the core objectives of the AFDC was to help ‚parents and relatives with 
whom (the children) are living to attain or retain capability for the maximum self support and 
personal independence.‛12  The state therefore exercised its responsibility to preserve the nu-
clear family by encouraging the development of self-reliance among its members.  On the 
other hand, some legislators expressed concerns about the effects of programs like the AFDC 
on the rates of divorce, illegitimacy and unemployment.   
The notion that it was the state’s duty to provide minimal sustenance for all Americans 
and to bring about the conditions that would allow for economic success, was associated with 
the ‚lack of economic opportunity‛ thesis.  The other prevalent framework on poverty re-
ferred to an entrenched ‚culture of poverty,‛ particularly among low-income black families.  
It was argued13 that enduring unemployment and marginalization had caused an intractable 
sentiment of hopelessness among black males in particular, which in turn affected the rates of 
divorce, abandonment and out-of-wedlock births in inner-city communities.  If the ‚lack of 
opportunity‛ frame has somewhat receded in the wake of neoliberal reforms, the racialization 
of the welfare subject has endured to this day.  Both of these strands informed the discursive 
and practical formulation of the War on Poverty put in motion by President Johnson. 
The key developmental logics of governmentality in the 1960s mostly had to do with a 
complex amalgam of welfare and neoliberal rationalities.  The estimated minimum of state 
assistance needed to sustain collective well being was almost invariably complemented with 
incentives to individual responsibility.  Infused with the spirit of modernization, large welfare 
programs were engineered through the latest scientific advances and management techniques.  
This logic of rule endured through most of the 1970s but efficiency-based management models 
began to change the way social programs were administered and, in particular, the concep-
tualization of the recipient’s‛ rights and responsibilities.  Notably, the 1970s marked the reas-
sertion of paid labour as a paradigm of morality and rationality. 
 
The 1970s: Work and Autonomy 
During the Second World War and the immediate years that followed, the creation of cor-
porations with distinctive identities claimed the allegiance of individuals who had previously 
been estranged from their work.  Workers became involved in the management of the enter-
prise and the state acknowledged the workers’ right to advantages like family health plans, 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 43. 
12 Social Security Act (Washington: United States Congress 601, 1964 supp IV), 42. 
13 For the foremost exposition of this kind of argument see the controversial report The Negro Family: The Case 
for National Action, Office of Planning and Research, United States Department of Labor (Washington DC: 
March 1965).  
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paid holidays and leisure activities.  Most Great Society programs were informed by this same 
commonly agreed upon ‘right’ to social protection.  However, the renewal of the subject’s 
emotional bond with his or her workplace and of the extensive role of the state in realizing the 
common good, soon gave way to a reflection on the adverse effects of uniform integration.  
The solidarist ethos of enterprise and the focus on harmonious group relations began 
to slip away in the 1970s.  The concern to increase productivity required that responsibilities 
be allocated according to competency.  This meant that a hierarchy of skills and managerial 
experience was being progressively instituted in the workplace.  The possibility of new skills 
acquisition and promotion constituted an inviting prospect for workers.14  In the decades that 
followed the war, the Marxist-inspired critique of work as a series of dull and compulsive 
motions, and of the severance of labour from self-fulfilment, gave way to all kinds of psy-
chological surveys on how to increase happiness in the workplace.  Research institutions15 in 
Europe, Scandinavia and North America published various studies on the ‚quality of wor-
king life.‛16  Experts on work relations, government officials and psychologists joined forces 
to represent the worker’s needs and aspirations and make them consistent with prevailing 
conceptions of democracy and liberty.  Many American CEOs found that getting workers 
more involved in the production process and making work more interesting increased pro-
ductivity.   
The subject of government in the 1970s was essentially constituted through the mu-
tually reinforcing tenets of self-help and labour.  In a historical overview of the Work Incen-
tive (WIN) program from 1968 to 1978, a congressional report vowed to increase the ‚quality 
and range of jobs,‛ provide ‚high quality training, (and)...  help youth further refine self-help 
techniques‛ in ‚order to enable WIN registrants to acquire the skills necessary for successful 
participation in the job market.‛17  As Jacques Donzelot points out, the articulation of an 
emerging subject demanding personal fulfilment, independence, humane and interesting 
tasks, opens the way for a formation permanente: ‚a continuous process of retraining, from the 
cradle to the grave, designed to provide the individual with a feeling of autonomy in relation 
to work, and at work.‛18  Through the careful identification of the individual’s feelings, am-
bitions and misgivings, work was to become an integral element of a fulfilling life.   
As a response to the budgetary pressures on the welfare system, international com-
petition and technological advances in the production sector, a series of adjustments were put 
in motion.  New management schemes were being developed in order to increase efficiency, 
reduce waste and streamline services.  Training programs also had to be implemented to 
keep up with a flurry of technological ameliorations.  U.S. government studies compared the 
                                                 
14 Nikolas Rose, Governing The Soul (London and New York: Free Association Books, 1989), 98. 
15 On this, see Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, ‚The Tavistock Programme: The Government of Subjectivity 
and Social Life,‛ Sociology, Vol. 22, No. 2, (1988) in which they assess the effect of psychological and mana-
gerial techniques on the reconceptualization of the workplace and the family from the welfare state to the 
advanced liberal state. 
16 Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose, ‚Governing Economic Life,‛ Economy and Society, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1990), 439. 
17 US Department of Labor, The Work Incentive Program: A Report at Ten Years (1968-1978) (Washington, US 
Government Printing Office, 1978), 38.  
18 Jacques Donzelot, Policing The Family (London: Hutchinson, 1979), 273.  
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American workforce with that of countries with higher productivity such as Japan.  The proli-
feration of psychological studies and government reports intent on discovering what made 
workers happy and therefore productive, meant that human relations in the workplace were 
now the object of conscientious calculation and manipulation.  On the one side, the produc-
tivity of each worker was measured by attributing the roles of specific characteristics like age, 
sex and race.19  On the other, each individual’s behaviour was monitored through persona-
lized counselling sessions and flexible arrangements were made available to the workers. 
In parallel with the appropriation and modulation of individual perceptions in the 
workplace, the government of welfare was conducted through ever-more standardized and 
thrifty managerial models.  The drive for efficiency characteristic of the emerging entrepre-
neurial culture of the 1970s began to affect state operation.  Throughout the 1970s, social pro-
grams were subjected to closer scrutiny.  Quality Control Programs conceived for the AFDC 
consisted in ‚producing a better administration of the Program by requiring States and loca-
lities to measure, identify and correct errors in administration.  As stated in the 1978 admini-
strative report, it was also directed at ‚reducing Federal matching of erroneous payments to a 
minimum.‛20  Reforms then vowed for a transfer of responsibility from the central state to 
smaller administrative units and for a systematic review of welfare claims.  Through the meti-
culous investigation of individual cases, quality control programs devised a formal selection 
process between deserving and undeserving recipients.   
At the end of the 1970s, however, official discourse was still infused with the idea that 
poverty and unemployment were products of the economic structure.  For example, the 1977 
Report of the WIN Program and Related Experiences persisted in blaming the American economy 
for ‚its inability to provide jobs‛ and states that ‚most persons are on welfare because they 
cannot earn enough in spite of their efforts to support their dependents.‛21  
Throughout the 1970s, welfare was subject to contrasting conceptualizations.  On the 
one hand, the individual’s own efforts were considered to be the surest means to quell un-
employment and welfare dependency.  This continuing focus on developing self-reliance was 
bolstered by the valuation of work and efficiency-based managerial models.  On the other 
hand, in the immediate aftermath of Great Society projects, the state was still expected to pro-
vide care for the most vulnerable.  Recipients had to demonstrate their motivation to over-
come the obstacles inherent to a competitive and rapidly changing labour market, but there 
was no real political emphasis on imparting responsibility to the individual for his or her 
poverty.   This was to change with the election of Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s, as his ad-
ministration actively favoured the transfer of ‚the social and economic risks of unemploy-
ment from state bureaucracies to the individual.‛22  
                                                 
19 William J. Baumol and Kenneth McLennan, Productivity growth and U.S. competitiveness (New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), 106. 
20 Committee on Government Operations, Administration of The AFDC Program (Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 1978), 202. 
21 US Department of Labor, The Work Incentive Program: A Report at Ten Years (1968-1978) (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1978), 37. 
22 Catherine McDonald and Greg Marston ‚Workfare as welfare: governing unemployment in the advanced 
liberal state,” Critical Social Policy, Vol. 25, No 3 (2005), 383. 




The 1980s: Neoliberalism and Individualism 
The Reagan’ era marked the intensification of the neoliberal logic of government, whereby the 
ability of individuals to judge and choose in a rational manner was given utmost value.  This 
focus on individual rationality was accompanied by a wide-ranging reconfiguration of respon-
sibility and the stigmatisation and disciplining of welfare recipients.  Reagan blamed the coun-
try’s poor economic performance on excessive federal interference and vowed to bring what 
he considered freedom of choice back to individuals, local authorities and state legislatures.  
For him, a partial withdrawal of the state from economic and policy domains was long over-
due because the Great Society had failed to deliver on its promises of equality, employment, 
education and crime control.  By the time Reagan came into office in 1980, work-for-welfare 
programs had generally failed to enrol recipients in permanent jobs.  Most states were finding 
federal targets difficult to meet and recipients were subjected to growing resentment from the 
rest of the population.  The administration was determined to end welfare dependency and 
put a number of discursive and practical injunctions to work.  On the discursive level, it ob-
jectified the welfare client as idle and dishonest.23  On the practical level, it imposed a variety 
of sanctions and obligations on applicants. 
The rationalization of state programs and the disciplining of welfare recipients were 
epitomized in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA).24  The AFDC was directly tar-
geted by the reform, more specifically through the restriction of eligibility requirements, the 
reduction of payments and the obligation of individual states to develop WIN demonstration 
Programs.25  Individual and institutional responsibility had become values of the highest or-
der, and such values were imposed through a series of increasingly strict incentives. 
At the same time, the state became increasingly concerned with the marital and educa-
tional habits of welfare recipients.  In the federal programs of the 1980s and 1990s, partici-
pation in paid labour and enjoyment of a normal family life constituted the explicit founda-
tions of a healthy social body.  In a report on the AFDC in 1986, Jo Anne B. Ross, the associate 
commissioner on family assistance, explained that ‚a child who sees his parent get up every 
morning and go to work learns the rewards—both financial and non financial—that come 
from work.  And he learns that goals are reached through work.‛26  Ross continued: ‚with re-
gular benefit payments, recipients tend to lose sight of their obligation to work toward self-
sufficiency.  They give up on themselves.‛27  A premature descent into desperation was pre-
                                                 
23 The 1980s generally marked the intensification of a trend among white middle-class Americans to label 
poor black single mothers as lazy and dishonest.  Reagan used the story of a fictional ‘Welfare Queen’ from 
the Side South of Chicago who used state benefits to buy a Cadillac repeatedly.  
24 Committee on Ways and Means AFDC, The President’s AFDC Work Proposals and the White House Domestic 
Policy Council Evaluation of Federal Welfare Programs (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1986), 15. 
The program focused on three areas: targeting those in need, improving administration and strengthening 
work requirements. 
25 Nancy E. Rose, Workfare or Fair work: Women, Welfare, and Government work Programs (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1995), 129. 
26 Committee on Ways and Means AFDC, 7. 
27 Ibid., 4. 
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cisely what was to be avoided if underprivileged citizens were to make it into the labour mar-
ket.  Defeatism had to make way for optimism and the state was bound to reward those who 
showed such inclinations.   
In the 1980s, the state’s responsibility had less to do with motivating people to work 
than with assisting those who were already inclined to do so.  The targeted individual was 
‚capable of self sufficiency‛ and could no longer be given the option to choose social benefits 
over employment.28  Whereas government acted upon the social communities formed out of 
disparate individuals in the 1960s and 70s, it now sought to stimulate the innate capability of 
each individual to respond to criteria of fulfilment and productivity.  Within this ethos, work 
once again occupied a central function as the purveyor of self-worth and purpose.  Unless they 
were incapacitated, individuals could not reasonably oppose the fulfilment of their humanity 
through labour.  The rewards associated with work were made as clear as the disadvantages 
of unemployment and the rhetoric employed continually reinforced that opposition.  But if 
choices were valued as essential components of self-realization in a competitive economy, they 
also had to be oriented in specific ways.  Dependency could no longer be a choice because it 
was represented as morally wrong and economically unproductive.  Substantive moral edu-
cation then took place through the control of incentives.  Recipients were brought to prioritize 
values such as uprightness, dependability and dignity. 
By the end of the 1980s, liberal as much as conservative platforms represented the 
American people’s distaste for what was seen as the inappropriate lifestyle of the poor.  Reci-
pients needed public support, it was argued, because women were having children out of 
wedlock, men were sidestepping their responsibilities as fathers and because very few showed 
enough motivation to work.29  However, aside from the occasional training program in com-
munity schemes, the governance of both crime and welfare in the 1980s and 1990s was charac-
terized by the exclusion of individuals considered beyond the reach of state assistance.  Some 
individuals were simply seen as irrevocably corrupt and ultimately responsible for making the 
wrong kinds of choices.30  According to this rationale, penal and welfare institutions had no 
other option but to exclude them from the rest of society.  Individuals were compelled to 
calculate the risks of their own actions, be they drug deals or the desertion of their wives, hus-
bands or children.  The regulatory instances of individual responsibility, self-control and self-
management were to become embedded in mentalities of rule for years to come. 
Through multiple discursive injunctions, the legitimacy of minimal state assistance 
dwindled in favour of assistance to the ‚‘deserving,‛ ‘who had to prove that they were doing 
everything in their power to find work.  As we have seen, the incentives and rewards sur-
rounding employment, as much as the consequences of failing to find a job, marked an intensi-
fication of the disciplinary currents observed in the previous decades.  The 1980s saw the 
successful establishment of a more drastic governmental program which relied heavily on 
individual rationality and conservative social values. 
 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 5. 
29 Nancy E. Rose, 139. 
30 James Q. Wilson, ‚Crime and American Culture,‛ The Public Interest, Vol. 70 (1983). 
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1990s: Community and the ‚Third Sector‛ 
Whilst the government of welfare in the 1990s pursued neoliberal techniques that induced 
morality and responsibility, the level and scope of control exercised upon the personalities and 
habits of welfare recipients actually increased.  A new element in the composition of govern-
mentality was the play and integration of the ethical aspirations of the private citizen.  Ethical 
aspirations were transformed into instruments of government, whereby the values emerging 
from the ‘community’ were to be used in order to create self-managing collectivities.  These 
transformations reconfigured the meaning and the operationalisation of democracy and citi-
zenship.  The notions of welfare as a right and of state-sponsored outlets for civic participa-
tion, once firmly associated with democracy, were gradually losing ground.   
As with most of the previous reforms of the AFDC since the early 1960s, the changes 
instated through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWOR) were based on the assumption that welfare engendered a state of helplessness, low 
self-esteem and dependency.31  The discursive objectification of individuals on welfare asser-
ted the intrinsic value of labour, independently of the recipient’s idea of what constituted a 
rewarding activity.  Both work and marriage were presented as undeniable providers of self 
worth, and as the essential pillars of an ordered society.  They lent meaning, pride and identity 
in an otherwise confusing and egotistical social environment.  In her empirical study of the 
effects of marriage on quality of life, Linda J. Waite found that marriage was associated with 
increased purchasing power, greater health and had a moderating effect on children’s 
propensity to either drop out of school or commit crimes.32  Work and marriage were not only 
distant ideals proclaimed by nostalgic conservatives or well-meaning presidents; they were 
seen as concrete regulatory instances which informed the elaboration of welfare programs and 
the training of a multitude of case workers, precisely because of their effect on a great variety 
of potentially prejudicial behaviours.  As Rose attests, ‚the technologies of welfare-to-work de-
ploy a mixture of re-moralizing therapies, pedagogies for inculcating citizenship competencies 
and punitive measures.‛33  Targeted individuals had to integrate and apply the guidelines 
learned in parenting classes, marriage preparation workshops and job seeking programs and 
their progress was routinely assessed by individual case workers.  Such a concerted effort in 
the form of persuasive educational schemes was ultimately made possible by the American 
people’s exasperation with the long-term ‘dependency’ of some elements of the underclass.  In 
the years that followed Reagan’s rhetorical assault on ‘undeserving’ recipients, academic and 
popular debate about welfare had effectively shifted toward a preoccupation with ‘depen-
dency.’34 
Furthering the devolutionary efforts initiated through the OBRA in the 1980s, the 
PRWOR formally released the federal government from its responsibility to care for the poor 
                                                 
31 See Nikolas Rose, ‚Community, Citizenship and The Third Way,‛ American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 43, 
No. 9, (2000), 1407 and Cruishank. 
32 Linda J. Waite, ‚Social Science Finds; Marriage Matters,‛ in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), The Essential Communi-
tarian Reader (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998). 
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and displaced it onto individual states and local authorities.  In line with the ever increasing 
role of the private sector in the delivery of welfare, the Act also appealed to the marketplace to 
provide competitive and high quality services.  However, anti-poverty strategies of the 1990s 
were explicitly reliant on the market and set employment as a condition for any sort of reward 
or assistance. 
Throughout the 1990s, the restrictive and punitive measures instigated during the 
Reagan era were actively sustained.  The signing into law of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWOR) in 1996 once again tightened work require-
ments.  Clinton’s vow to ‚end welfare as we know it‛ basically meant exchanging welfare for 
work after two years for all ‘able bodied adults,’ and terminating benefits altogether after a 
period of five years on the rolls.  Welfare provision was indeed completely transformed by 
those measures.  Any reference to the notion of assistance as entitlement had formally disap-
peared and welfare was officially defined as a transitional and ‘temporary’ state.35  The work-
related component of the PRWOR, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
applied ever stricter performance quotas for states in the attempt to move recipients unto the 
labour market.36  The Act also required states to develop ‚personal employability plans,‛ 
which taught recipients about the necessary manners and qualities required to obtain and hold 
down a job.  To stimulate performance, the various local instances in charge of welfare pro-
vision competed for monetary rewards allocated to those agencies that devised the best 
motivational programs and achieved the highest work placement percentages.   
The ‘third sector,’ composed of private, public and voluntary organizations, constituted 
both an outlet for governmental goals regarding welfare and crime control, and an alliance of 
regulatory agencies that provided civic education in the hope of eliminating the need for 
direct state intervention.  Responsibility for the management and implementation of basic 
state functions was in effect diffused to individuals and communities.  The goals of safety and 
well-being, represented as commonly accepted goods in local and national life, ideally re-
quired the collaboration, involvement and notification of each and every citizen.37  Citizens 
were beginning to see themselves in terms of their respective ethical commitments, as proud 
contributors to the changing outlooks on local, national and international issues.  A number of 
Community Organisations, Interfaith Partnerships and community service institutions like 
AmeriCorps participated in the effort to assist, educate and restore underprivileged 
communities.  Influential alliances like the Coalition of Human Needs, formed in 1993 out of 
hundreds of labour, religious and Women’s groups, laid out a series of principles that were 
presented to Congress.38  In terms of work placements, large organizations such as the Good-
will coalition contributed to employ and train thousands of recipients.      
The other crucial component of the Personal Responsibility Act was its concep-
tualisation of marriage and family.  The Act posed marriage as ‚the foundation of a successful 
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society.‛39  Fathers and mothers were made responsible to manage the social risk of engen-
dering an unruly child, and their ability to preserve their marriage as well as to rear children, 
were subject to increased scrutiny.  Furthermore, to impress the consequences of irresponsible 
behaviour reflected in the high rates of divorce and teenage out-of-wedlock pregnancies, mea-
sures and programs insisting on ‘male responsibility’ were enacted.  The state allocated com-
petitive grants for the development of programs like ‚Fathers Work,‛ concerned with assisting 
fathers ‚who owe child support and help[ing] them connect with their children.‛40  Again, the 
management of these programs would be ensured by ‚one stop career centres, community 
groups and faith-based organizations under contract to local and state workforce investment 
boards.‛41  Parents were represented as having a key role in preventing crime, delinquency 
and teenage pregnancy by transmitting clear ethical principles to their children.  If parents fai-
led to assume that responsibility by, for example, deserting their family or refusing to pay 
child support, they risked having their wages reduced, their bank accounts seized and their 
tax refunds withheld.42 
The PRA also included a ‚program for abstinence education‛ in which restraint from 
sexual activity outside of marriage was posed an as explicit norm.  The plan ‚teaches that a 
mutually faithful monogamous relationship in the context of marriage is the expected stan-
dard of human sexual activity‛ and that sex outside of marriage ‚is likely to have harmful 
psychological and physical effects.‛43  This representation of marriage entails that it is the only 
legitimate institution to accommodate sexual activity and child-rearing.  The notion that mar-
riage is an essential means for social and moral regulation engendered a myriad of training 
programs to safeguard and promote it.  Under George W. Bush, the Personal Responsibility, 
Work, and Family Promotion Act (2003), essentially following on from Clinton’s initiatives, 
proposed public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage and workshops on how to 
develop ‘marriage,’ ‘relationship’ and ‘budgeting’ skills.44  The valuation of one particular 
form of family, which induced certain qualities and produced a certain kind of citizen (drug 
free, emotionally balanced, responsible, hard-working and principled), was not altogether 
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2. Foreign Assistance: A Governmental History 
 
US-AID (1960-2000) 
The above study of the AFDC was an attempt to better understand the recent history of ratio-
nalities of government within the United States through the observation of the shifting modes 
of power associated with the definition of freedom, responsibility and efficiency.  In this sec-
tion, we examine the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to 
determine if the changing practices, ideas and techniques identified in the U.S. domestic 
sphere are reflected in the recent history of foreign assistance programs.  Since its creation in 
1961, USAID has played a considerable role in shaping the technological, economic and poli-
tical landscape of several developing countries and the effects of its interventions can certainly 
be viewed as a form of governmentality.  Although Foucault’s analysis of government was 
largely confined to national spaces, forays have been made into the analysis of global net-
works of power.45 One of the objectives of the analysis below is to demonstrate that rationa-
lities of government can actually operate across the lines of domestic and foreign policy.  To 
do so, we follow the thematic and temporal structure of part one and discuss modernization, 
self-help, efficiency models and neoliberal responsibility as alternating and combining modes 
of disposing people, things and ideas in foreign assistance ventures.    
 
1960s: Modernization and U.S.  Foreign Assistance 
As much as poor Americans were rendered more visible through their heightened repre-
sentation in public discourse and as objects of social scientific inquiry after the Second World 
War, developing countries emerged as objects of concern and study within the hierarchical 
and rationalizing discourse of modernization.  As Nils Gilman notes, ‚modernization theory 
was the foreign policy counterpart to ‘social modernism’ at home, namely the idea that a me-
liorist, rationalizing, benevolent, technocratic state could solve all social and economic ills.‛46 
In the two decades that followed the Second World War, the depiction of poverty as morally 
unacceptable was particularly prevalent among liberal welfare states.  The will to ‚improve‛ 
and to ‚empower‛47 developing countries was supported by the belief that technology, 
rational planning and economic growth would eradicate poverty globally.  These modes of 
representation created grids according to which developing countries were assessed.  Typi-
cally, countries under the gaze of a modernizing outlook were presented as technologically 
deficient, administratively inefficient and economically unproductive.  These lacks or needs 
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constituted a terrain for intervention, where specific elements of a country’s productive capa-
bilities were targeted for improvement.  Poor countries were represented as ‚in need of go-
vernment‛ and converted ‚into subjects of intervention‛ by wealthy countries like the United 
States.48 
American aid policy in the early to mid 1960s comprised of three main elements, each 
of which replicated the neoliberal/welfare rationality observed in the domestic realm.  First, 
scientific methods were applied to the management and implementation of aid and deve-
lopment programs.  For the apostles of modernization, ‚technology was theorized as a sort of 
moral force that would operate by creating an ethics of innovation, yield and result.‛49 
Economic growth, technological transfer and infrastructural ameliorations were posed as 
goods in themselves, often independently of contextual needs.  These technical and intel-
lectual rationalizations set wide-ranging development standards, generated detailed infor-
mation on targeted countries and coordinated the many state agencies involved in the deli-
very of foreign aid.  Second, the implementation of foreign assistance objectives as to political 
participation, welfare programs, institutional capacity and economic growth supposed the 
gradual acquisition of the qualities presumably demonstrated by aid providers, most notably 
the attainment of ‚‘self-help‛‘ for recipient countries and their citizens.  Third, national iden-
tity would be consolidated not only through its opposition to communism but through a de-
monstration of the superiority of American Welfare Capitalism as a model of development 
and as a way of life.  All three elements were part and parcel of modernization, which offered 
a measure of ‘civilization’ and material development as much as a validation of the economic 
and social institutions of the United States.   
The imprint of modernisation as a mode of government was clear in the discursive 
modalities and the legislative changes that surrounded foreign assistance.  The passing into 
law of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act represented a considerable change from the aid policy 
of the previous administrations.  Under Eisenhower and Truman, aid programs were disper-
sed, poorly organized and served a mainly ideological purpose.  President Kennedy’s main 
objective was to regroup and reorganize the various agencies (International Cooperation 
Agency, Development Loan Fund, Export-Import Bank, Food for Peace Program) responsible 
for foreign assistance in one centralized, effectively managed organization: USAID.  Kennedy 
asserted that Foreign Aid was important because the ‚economic collapse of those free but less-
developed nations… would be disastrous to our national security, harmful to our comparative 
prosperity and offensive to our conscience.‛50 He also believed that the prosperity and poli-
tical will generated in the 1960s presented a timely opportunity to elevate poorer countries to 
self-sufficiency and stability.  It was also clear for Kennedy that Americans were morally re-
sponsible to lead the free world and that international security could only be insured through 
a wide ranging increase in living standards.  The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act stated the inten-
tion to ‚promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by assis-
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ting people of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and 
external security, and for other purposes.‛51  The pursuit of peace and prosperity at home was 
therefore reflected in its pursuit abroad. 
The AID Program Guidance Manual of 1962 stated that the purpose of foreign assistance 
consisted in developing ‚a community of free nations cooperating on matters of mutual 
concern, basing their political systems on consent and progressing in economic welfare and 
social justice.  Such a world offers the best prospect of security and peace for the United 
States.‛52  The attainment of common welfare depended upon the constitution of an institu-
tional structure that allowed for the realization of sovereign duties and the formulation of an 
equitable model of development, both domestically and in concert with a community of 
states committed to global welfare.  Even if the institutional frameworks regulating inter-
national trade and politics were not as developed as they are today, the majority of Western 
powers agreed on the necessity and value of state assistance.  In general, the elaboration of a 
social state first entailed the creation and education of a bureaucratic core.  Secondly, it 
required elaborate methods to conceive and evaluate an increasing variety of social pro-
grams.  Third, technical and financial means were needed for large infrastructural improve-
ments.  Fourth and last, a variety of informal and culturally sensitive means had to be de-
vised in order to predispose local populations to the supposed benefits of industrialization 
and liberal democracy.53     
The objective of this renewed aid impetus was no less than to transform the social 
structure of developing countries through political education, institution-building and infra-
structural projects.  Gilman notes that ‚as development projects began to take as their object 
not the palimpsest of traditional practices, but rather the ‚human material‛ itself- conceived 
as a universal subject whose needs, prospects, and norms could be discovered, interpreted, 
and fixed by science—modernization theory began to take a more revolutionary aspect that 
aimed at remaking the identities of traditional people and societies.‛54  Although USAID has 
exercised a degree of control over local populations and has either put in place or perpe-
tuated structures of domination reminiscent of colonial policies, the outcome of its deve-
lopment ventures has been to ‚produce not so much extractive-effects on colonial bodies as 
governing-effects on colonial conduct.‛55 
Concrete measures such as progressive tax reforms, land reforms, voluntary work and 
political participation were actively encouraged, organized and monitored.56  Depending on 
the ‘willingness’ of specific countries to ‚‘help themselves,‛‘ U.S. development programs 
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would strive to instil desirable qualities such as entrepreneurship, efficiency and self-reliance.  
Foreign assistance encouraged initiatives at the level of ‘society’ and empowered those indi-
viduals who showed a desire to improve their lives by participating in development schemes.  
Assistance programs in the 1960s therefore emphasized the training and education of local 
populations in view of their integration in a working network of institutions related to the 
central state.  Development aid was then given directly to state administrations and civil so-
ciety associations in an effort to encourage ‚the transition into self-sustained growth‛57 as 
opposed to a permanent contract of assistance.  The treatment of recipient countries, much 
like that of individuals in domestic welfare programs, rested on incentives to self-help.  This 
meant that aid would serve as a ‚catalyst for local self-sufficiency and (eventually) contribute 
to its own self-elimination.‛58  As Lyndon B. Johnson asserted in his special Message to Con-
gress on Foreign Aid in 1967, aid should not be provided as a ‘substitute,’ it had to be applied 
to and integrated with the fabric of social, economic and political development of poor coun-
tries.  Again, in the 1960s, the substantial responsibility of the state in facilitating the attain-
ment of ‚‘self-help‛‘ was taken for granted.  It was also made possible, in part, by the distinct 
unity of moral purpose translated in the solidarist ethos of the Kennedy-Johnson era.   
In effect, development aid was part of an integrated system of thought which included 
goals as varied and ambitious as the use of scientific methods for administrative purposes, 
the suppression of communism and the promotion of international peace and prosperity 
through the extension of welfare capitalism.  As one commentator put it, foreign aid became 
‚a handy multipurpose instrument of foreign policy, which we have been tempted to use in 
an increasingly wide variety of ways, for an increasingly broad range of purposes.‛59  The ex-
tension of technological and bureaucratic know-how and the increase of welfare standards 
throughout the world were viewed as two sides of the same coin.  Michael E. Latham asso-
ciated these aspirations with the ideology of ‘modernization.’ As he put it, ‚building infra-
structure, furnishing technology, providing training, and even demonstrating the virtues of 
efficiency, long term planning, pluralist politics and personal discipline‛ and generally 
adopting an ‚achievement-oriented ethos,‛ would ensure the development of targeted coun-
tries.60  
As subjects of governmental intervention, developing countries were constructed as 
culturally and materially backward and judged according to indicators of ‚modernity‛ such 
as the state of the infrastructure, public institutions and economic performance.61  Rostow’s 
influential formulation of the five stages of growth provided a classificatory scheme for 
national economies frequently referred to by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.62 
Once levels of development were determined, a series of requirements could be elaborated.   
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The populations, resources and existing institutions of less developed countries (LDCs) were 
mapped out more rigorously and an increasing amount of data was processed in order to 
tease out the productive capacities of poorer nations.  Specific factors impeding or enabling 
development such as population growth were isolated and studied through ‚censuses and 
demographic (reports), surveys of knowledge practices of conception control, fertility pat-
terns, and methods of evaluating family planning programs.‛63  
 
1970s: Responsibility and Efficiency 
Similarly to the domestic situation, the all-embracing ambitions of modernization proved 
difficult to realize.  The willingness to increase living standards throughout the world was 
thwarted by a lack of resources and organization.  Partly because of these contingencies, the 
content of responsibility began to shift.  Throughout the modernizing era, the representation 
of poverty as the product of economic imbalances meant that most of the responsibility for 
international development lay with wealthier countries.  However, beginning in the early 
1970s, states who received financial assistance were being held accountable for their own 
shortcomings.  U.S. foreign assistance focused on the most deprived individuals of a desig-
nated country instead of trying to build up infrastructural capabilities.  As with domestic 
welfare programs, the conceptualization and techniques pertaining to the U.S. development 
effort in the 1970s were informed by more stringent efficiency standards.  As we show here, 
poor countries receiving aid were inserted in new power and knowledge configurations; new 
spaces of intervention were opened up in concert with the materialization of a discourse on 
responsibility and efficiency.  In response to the perceived failures of modernization, the go-
vernment of welfare and of foreign assistance entailed a renewed focus on individual 
accountability and a sustained appeal to technical rationalization.    
In times of fiscal restraint, foreign assistance programs were among the first to be tar-
geted for budgetary cuts.  The U.S. government was no longer justified in allocating funds to 
endeavours that did not advance American interests or the causes of peace and prosperity.  
Much like the domestic initiatives to deal with poverty, the aspirations of the aid effort were 
seen as too hasty, far-reaching and ambitious.  However, if international involvement was 
seen neither as a moral obligation nor as a budgetary priority, the need to preserve the 
domestic welfare system benefited from a more solid consensus.  This lack of public will ex-
posed foreign assistance to experimental reforms such as privatisation, new evaluation 
methods and selective budget cuts earlier than welfare programs.  Aside from the variations 
in degrees of priority, both governmental areas were transformed by increasingly strict 
standards of efficiency and performance.   
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 suggested that programs and missions be better 
evaluated and monitored as well as better coordinated with existing civil and state insti-
tutions.  This could be done through ‚specifying and elaborating quantitative and beha-
vioural models, constructing and testing hypotheses in the field of local action capabilities 
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and providing consulting assistance to field missions and local collaborating entities‛ to en-
hance their ability to collect, analyse and utilize local data to improve the effectiveness of ru-
ral development programs.64  As Escobar attests, the forms of power that appear in the midst 
of such rationalizations ‚act....by controlled knowledge‛ and by ‚the bureaucratization of 
social action,‛ instead of by imposition or altruistic motives.65 
Underneath the linear history of administrative reforms lies a more general rethinking 
of the activity of government.  The separation of centralized aid programs in specialized areas 
of intervention, the increase of effectiveness through the reduction of bureaucratic impe-
diments to decision-making, the increase of coordination between existing institutions and 
the evaluation of project performance, are all measures that modified the attitudes, roles and 
expectations of state institutions and individuals involved in development initiatives.  The fo-
cus on administrative efficiency translated the progressive loss of coherence in the foreign 
assistance logic of the 1960s.  The unity of purpose implicit in the diffusion of capitalist 
democracy was tainted by the failure of the American war effort in Vietnam.  Consequently, 
foreign assistance programs became less outward and were subjected to a host of internal 
reforms.  A new development rationale seeped through a variety of practical changes.  These 
covert governmental transformations formed new identities, validated new credos, generated 
new practices and created new requirements, one of which was the diffusion of respon-
sibility. 
In his address to Congress in 1970, Nixon insisted that developing countries had to 
‚assume a larger role in defining their own development strategies.‛66  Countries deemed 
unable to use their aid money properly saw their assistance reduced or in more extreme cases 
withdrawn.  The earlier priority of increasing general economic output meant that issues 
surrounding accountability and quality control had not yet surfaced to the fore.  But around 
the mid 1970s, assistance was redirected towards ‚deserving‛ countries which, through the 
comparative assessment of their performance, had shown that they could ‚help them-
selves.‛67  If the larger portion of aid was still being channelled through state institutions, the 
latter were placed under increased scrutiny.  The world was now increasingly seen as a col-
lection of responsible sovereign nations considered capable of looking after their own popu-
lations.  Their success or failure to do so was a matter of their making the right kinds of 
choices.  In its effort to make aid more direct, visible and effective, American Foreign Assi-
stance held indigenous state institutions responsible for identifying ‘high priority’ deve-
lopment and relief needs. 
At the same time, the New Directions (1973) approach for bilateral aid was to ‚be car-
ried out to the maximum extent possible through the private sector, particularly those 
institutions which already have ties in the developing areas, such as educational institutions, 
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cooperatives, credit unions and voluntary agencies.‛68  The responsibility for the task of deve-
loping third world countries in times of fiscal restraint had to be distributed through a greater 
array of agencies.  Federal initiatives at the end of the 1970s essentially continued the reforms 
of 1973 by multiplying evaluation programs, decentralizing decision-making overseas, en-
couraging the private sector and soliciting international donors. 
 
The 1980s: Neoliberalism and the Critique of Foreign Aid 
The growing role of private enterprise, International Financial Organizations and local actors 
in the development ventures of the 1970s only became more apparent in the 1980s.  A dis-
course defined by its staunch criticism of state intervention and the ‚‘dependency‛‘ it pro-
duced, established itself with great force throughout the 1980s.  The emerging neoliberal ratio-
nality of government effectively posed the ‚market‛ as a universally applicable solution to 
poverty.  Since it was deemed that the state had failed in its efforts to eliminate poverty, the 
market would offer a rationalization of the complex relationships between the various deve-
lopment actors.  As Timothy Mitchell argues in his study on Egypt, the market became a ‚sim-
ple image for picturing the relations between farmers, labourers, landowners, state officials, 
international agribusinesses, and consumers, an image that reduces these interrelated but very 
unequal concentrations of power into nominally equivalent buyers and sellers.‛69 Neo-
liberalism’s imprint on public policy had the double effect of dehumanizing the subjects of 
state intervention and of depoliticizing poverty by submitting it to the law of numbers and 
efficiency.  What’s more, individuals and developing countries that remained in a state of need 
and deprivation were now simply viewed as anomalies, either unwilling or unable to 
accomplish what was being asked of them.   
Just as he did with domestic welfare, Reagan identified the size of the developing 
countries’ governments as one of the main impediments to economic progress and adopted 
measures to increase the contribution of the private sector.  In fact, the very notion of foreign 
assistance was put in doubt, as it ‚undercut the recipient’s ability for sustained growth.‛70  In 
1982, USAID set up the Bureau for Private Enterprise, intent on the ‚growth of productive, 
self-sustaining income and job-producing private sectors in developing countries, using the 
financial, technological expertise of the U.S.’ private sector, indigenous resources, multilateral 
institutions and agency resources.‛71  By teasing out the productive capabilities of target coun-
tries, purveying technical know-how and demonstrating efficiency standards, American go-
vernmentality was beginning to remodel developing countries according to its own bench-
marks. 
For the most part, free market ideologues dictated the modalities through which 
deficiencies in the internal management of developing countries were apprehended.  Com-
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mentators such as Nicholas Eberstadt, Doug Bandow and Peter Bauer hinted at what they saw 
as the fundamental problems facing developing countries.  The basic fact being that ‚even 
when public officials are not corrupt they are human.  Relief from the economic constraint of 
serving consumers enables public officials to substitute their own priorities, however well in-
tentioned, for those of consumers.‛72  For conservative development experts, the motivations 
and calculations of individual consumers served as the basic materials for economic growth.  
They blamed foreign assistance programs such Food for Peace (PL 480), introduced in the 
1950s, for discouraging the local production and consumption of agricultural stocks.  Follo-
wing a plain cost/benefit calculation, individuals were naturally inclined to choose free goods 
over costly ones.  Furthermore, the initial provision of aid had only created a subsequent need 
for more aid and generated an unbroken circle of dependency.73  According to radical pro-
ponents of free market ideals, the very notion of foreign assistance or welfare benefits (apart 
for seriously impaired individuals) was irrational and had to be abolished.   
Once again, government acted upon the individual’s potential ability to self-regulate.  
In the 1980s, local development projects began to foster the participation of the poor, enlisting 
them as agents of their own transformation.  As stated in a congressional report on countries 
receiving U.S.  assistance, one of the objectives of  USAID programs was to ‚improve the fun-
damental life skills of adults,‛74 which presumably meant enhancing their ability to organize 
their own lives, start viable enterprises and take responsibility for the welfare of their families 
and communities.  As a governmental disposition, the free expression of individual energies in 
the market place seemed to apply as a rational solution to economic and political problems 
across time and space.  Means for neoliberal economic development included ‚encouraging 
individuals to capitalize themselves, to invest in the management, presentation, promotion 
and enhancement of their own economic capital as a capacity of their selves and as a lifelong 
project.‛75  As targets of intervention, individual subjects in poor countries were at once free to 
pursue their own economic goals and made responsible to integrate the guidelines for 
economic success.  They were inserted in new systems of relations and their treatment and 
definition in project reports changed overnight.  As one commentator on USAID agricultural 
programs put it, ‚farmers suddenly become rural entrepreneurs.‛76 
 
Conditionality 
More than any other set of measures or discourses, conditionality embodied the sharp dis-
ciplinary turn that marked the relationship between wealthy and developing countries in the 
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1980s.  The official objective of conditionality was to increase the role of markets relative to 
the public sector, improve incentive structures, augment the efficiency of the public sector 
and mobilize additional domestic resources.77  Towards the end of the 1970s and through the 
1980s, the U.S. government started to apply it more decisively through the co-financing of the 
World Bank’s policy-based operations.  USAID, not associating directly with the Structural 
Adjustment programs of International Financial Institutions, used program headings such as 
‚policy dialogue‛ to further macro-structural reforms in some countries. 
Towards the end the 1980s and through the 1990s, economic and political reforms 
under the auspices of conditionality were presented as being in the interest of poorer coun-
tries.  Once those interests were constituted in a rudimentary form in the subjects’ cognition 
or that contractual obligations for aid were firmly established, more conditions such as ‘good 
governance’ could be added.  The very notion of conditions for assistance, namely a forced 
adaptation of state and society structures to the mechanisms of international financial 
markets, was a defining development of the 1980s.  The poor countries who failed to develop 
were penalized.  Again, this had striking similarities with the disciplining of welfare reci-
pients.  The enactment of these measures marked the passage from the modern development 
theory espoused by Kennedy to the regulation of individuals and institutions through market 
mechanisms.  Economic development was effectively becoming the responsibility of recipient 
countries and individual entrepreneurs.  The standards of living and social structures of 
many developing nations suffered immensely from the imposition of these ideational and 
financial parameters. 
 
1990s: Development and Neoliberal Internationalism 
If Structural Adjustment Programs managed by the IMF and the World Bank endured 
throughout the 1990s, the consequences of their zealous application in the 1980s were widely 
criticized and addressed in a variety of reforms.  The neoliberal turn in the administration of 
international economy was reconsidered according to new normative covenants put forth by 
governments, civil society institutions and individuals alike at the beginning of the 1990s.  The 
shift to global governance was marking the progressive disappearance of ‚coordinated, hierar-
chical structures and processes of societal steering‛ in favour of ‚a network-based process of 
exchange and negotiation.‛78  As Ferguson and Gupta point out, global governmentality 
 
includes not only new strategies of discipline and regulation, exemplified by the 
WTO and the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF, but also 
transnational alliances forged by activists and grassroots organizations and the 
proliferation of voluntary organizations supported by complex networks of inter-
national and transnational funding and personnel.79 
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In contrast with the transposition of modernizing planning or with the imposition of fiscal 
discipline unto recipient countries, the emerging compact of development appealed to the 
inherent ability of state and non-state actors to integrate the now universal norms of economic 
growth and good governance.  In line with the progressive displacement of state functions 
toward self-regulating spaces such as the market and the third sector, International Govern-
mental and Non-Governmental Organizations took a more active part in elaborating and 
implementing particular criteria for targeted countries.  Where neoliberalism was becoming 
‘moralized’ through the integration of community in the micro-management of the domestic 
sphere, foreign aid and development practices were also increasingly defined through a 
multiplicity of sites of power, each faced with the unspoken necessity to internalize and 
perpetuate good conduct and best practice.  In and amongst the governmentalization of an 
international civil society, the market remained a very important benchmark in the self-
assimilation of desirable behaviour.  As Tania Li comments, ‚in the distinctly neoliberal for-
mulation of the World Bank, communities of poor people were encouraged to take on respon-
sibility for their own improvement by engaging with markets, learning how to conduct them-
selves in competitive arenas.‛80  Development was beginning to be constituted in and amongst 
the mutually reinforcing standards of administrative efficiency, decentralization, market eco-
nomics and liberal democracy.  The governmental rationale behind the transformations of 
foreign assistance programs of the 1990s then stood at the intersection of managerial tech-
niques and ethical criteria, as well as between domestic hesitations and cosmopolitan sen-
timents.  The combination of self-help, competitiveness and ethical self-identifications contri-
buted to define the governmental landscape of the 1990s both at home and abroad. 
In line with the dual tendency toward entrepreneurship and responsibilization, USAID 
became more focused on its ‚‘clients,‛‘ in this case, the poor.  In the early 1990s, themes such 
as ‚‘decentralization‛‘ and ‚‘local empowerment‛‘ became common in the vocabulary of ma-
ny international organizations.  In 1990, the World Bank reunited several IGOs and NGOs, 
among which was USAID, and formed ‘participation learning groups’ intent on discussing 
how best to involve and empower the local beneficiaries of development projects.  Following 
the movement of decentralization in donor countries, which was intimately tied to the objec-
tive of delivering services effectively and at a minimal cost, USAID progressively began to 
encourage a participatory approach in client countries.  For example, when a study found that 
few local actors were getting involved in a decentralized water project in Nicaragua, USAID 
‚trained municipal officials in ways to increase participation, resulting in a campaign that 
brought about the involvement of students, teachers, community members and religious 
leaders.‛81 The involvement of local communities entailed the development of competencies to 
do with planning, organizing and budgeting as well as the long-term establishment of stan-
dards of participation and accountability.  By impressing the correct ethical and procedural 
practices in the projects it financed, USAID could hope to instil self-reliance among local bene-
ficiaries. 
                                                 
80 Li, 243.  
81 Jeremy Shiffman and Faith Corneille, ‚Scaling-up Participation at USAID,‛ Public Administration and Deve-
lopment, Vol. 24 (2004), 259. 
Foucault Studies, No. 12, pp. 147-170. 
169 
 
Without the impetus to support the cause of freedom and democracy in countries 
under communist threat, the American public doubted the agency’s legitimacy and effec-
tiveness, which somewhat hampered USAID’s ability to integrate and meet the emerging 
standards of humanitarian internationalism.  On the one hand, the coordination of US foreign 
assistance required an improved linkage with the expanding array of aid agencies and 
International Financial Institutions.  It also had to assimilate the ‚good governance agenda,‛82 
considered as the ‚prevailing paradigm of development‛ comprising of ‚democracy, human 
rights, transparency and political decentralization.‛ On the other hand, one of the core objec-
tives of Clinton’s foreign policy program was to expand international markets and to use this 
expansion as groundwork for peace and democracy.  Clinton’s foreign policy was largely in-
formed by the promotion of what he called ‚the new fabric of commerce.‛83  His brand of 
liberal internationalism did translate a belief in the ‚‘civilizing‛‘ virtues of the market.  But un-
like classical liberalism, the marketplace of the 1990s was a highly controlled and regulated 
environment, and economic transactions as much as infrastructure projects were subject to 
greater scrutiny; transparency and efficiency were often posed as conditions to do business.  
The extension of the virtues of market economy required specific moral and technical 
competencies, but also a political system which accommodated enterprise and innovation.  It 
was therefore worthwhile to form individuals in developing countries to diffuse norms 
through educational forums on human rights, anti corruption programs and democracy work-
shops.  Again, the resulting emergence of a civil society aware of common rules for economic 
and non-economic development, constituted a field of intervention which regulated itself in 
parallel and in cooperation with state institutions.   
 
Conclusion 
The examination of American welfare and foreign aid programs in this article has revealed 
ideas, techniques, discourses and policies that combined to produce more or less coherent 
rationalities of rule such as modernization, neoliberalism and government through com-
munity.  These rationalities invariably built from pre-existing foundations and they alterna-
tively combined or competed through changing contexts.  As we have seen, the poor consti-
tute the principal object for political and economic platforms of all ideological leanings.  Con-
stituted as anomalies in behavioural and socio-economic terms, the poor are ascribed an iden-
tity that corresponds with an optimal way of government at the expense of a more complex, 
‚‘politicized‛‘ portrayal of their subjectivity.   
Conveying both a general and a specific character, rationalities of government pervade 
the economic and political doctrines presented as solutions to problems in the management of 
populations, but also shape the lives of many individuals by suggesting and formulating 
specific attitudes and expectations.  As our analysis has shown, the deployment of techniques, 
theories and discourses that define and direct objects of government stretches across the 
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domestic and the foreign policy spectrum.  This demonstrates not only the flexibility and per-
vasiveness of rationalities of government but also casts doubt on the time-honoured dis-
tinction between the domestic and the international, and on the idea that they should be stu-
died separately because they evolve under different conditions. 
Foucault’s theory of governmentality provides insights into the often-unnoticed direc-
tives that pass through our daily activities and highlights the importance of seemingly benign 
changes in the spatial, temporal and procedural dispositions of social institutions.  The de-
tailed and lucid appraisal of what constitutes our personal and social identities is the first step 
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